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FIGHTING BACK: OFFENSIVE SPEECH AND
CULTURAL CONFLICT
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
VER the past decade, there has been a seemingly endless string of
public controversies involving attempts to regulate or suppress of-
fensive speech.' By offensive speech, I mean speech that is harmful
primarily, or at least to a significant degree, because it is distasteful or repug-
nant to some communities or individual members of the audience, some-
times to the extent of causing psychic injury.2 It is often impossible to fully
or even partially separate the manner of speech from the idea expressed espe-
cially in this area,3 and it is usually a combination of the two which gives rise
to the controversy. With respect to racial insults for instance, it is both the
crudeness and hatefulness of the language in issue as well as the assertion of
inferiority and exclusion which hurts and offends.
Recent conflicts over offensive speech include attempts to prohibit or regu-
late burning of the American flag,4 racial insults on campus and elsewhere, 5
* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University. Southern Methodist University,
B.A., 1970; University of Michigan, J.D., 1973.
1. In response to these developments, Southern Methodist University Law School of-
fered a special course titled "The Regulation of Offensive Speech" funded with income from
the William Hawley Atwell Chair in Constitutional Law. The course was taught by four dis-
tinguished visitors - Dean Lee Bollinger, Professor Ruth Colker, Professor Mar Matsuda
and Professor Nadine Strossen - as well as four members of the school's constitutional law
faculty.
2. Most First Amendment controversies do not involve offensive speech. Examples of
non-offensive speech issues include seditious speech, defamation, commercial speech, cam-
paign speech and funding, prior restraint, speech in public employment, and access to public
proceedings.
3. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 (1989).
4. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); see John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Kent Greenawalt,
O'er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 UCLA L. REV. 925 (1990); Frank
Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111 (1989).
5. See UWM Post Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (invalidating University of Wisconsin regulation); Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (invalidating University of Michigan regulation);
see also REGULATING RACIAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM (T.
Hustoles & W. Connolly, Jr. eds. 1990); J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within
the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991); Stephen L. Carter, Racial Harassment as
Discrimination: A Cautious Endorsement of the Anti-Oppression Principle, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 13; Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus]; Richard Delgado, Words that
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the burning of a cross to intimidate minorities, 6 traditionally defined obscen-
ity,7 pornography depicting the subordination of women," indecent language
on the radio,9 indecent commercial telephone messages, 10 demonstrations by
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133 (1982); Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First
Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985); Steve France, Hate Goes to College, ABA
Journal, July 1990, at 44; Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets.: Are They Protected Speech?,
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go.
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and
Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1991);
Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320 (1989); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment
Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990); Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484;
Symposium, Free Speech and Religious, Racial, and Sexual Harassment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 207 (1991); James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus
Hatespeech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (1991); Symposium, Campus Hate Speech and the
Constitution in the Aftermath of Doe v University of Michigan, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1309 (1991).
6. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 60 U.S.L.W. 4667 (June 23, 1992) (invali-
dating ordinance which made it a crime to display a symbol which one has reason to know will
arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender); see
also United States v. Lee, 60 U.S.L.W. 2004 (8th Cir. 1991) (sustaining a conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 241 making it a crime to intimidate a person in the exercise of a constitutional right
where the defendant burned a cross on land adjacent to the apartment of a black family in
order to induce them to move).
7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986); HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND
PUBLIC MORALITY (1969); GORDON HAWKINS AND FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY
IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988).
8. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986) (invalidating a detailed ordinance which banned pornography defined as "the
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or words..."); John
Elson, Passions Over Pornography, TIME, March 30, 1992 at 52 (noting that bills have been
introduced in the United States Senate and the Massachusetts legislature which would provide
a civil damages remedy to individuals who could prove that they were the victims of sex crimes
which were caused in part by the use of pornography); see also ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOG-
RAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 127-213 (1987); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON
PORNOGRAPHY (L. Lederer ed. 1980); Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism and
the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607
(1987); Eric Hoffman, Feminism, Pornography and the Law, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1985);
Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et
al., in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987-89); Fred-
erick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 737; Nadine Strossen, The Convergence of Feminist and Civil Liberties Principles in the Por-
nography Debate, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987) (reviewing WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP
(1985)); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589.
9. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see ARTHUR SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX
OTHER STORIES (1986); Jay Gayoso, The FC.C.'s Regulation of Broadcast Indecency.- A
Broadened Approach for Removing Immorality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871
(1989); Richard Passler, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broadcasts. George Carlin Revisited-
What Does the Future Hold for the Seven "Dirty" Words, 65 TUL. L. REV. 131 (1990).
10. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)(invalidating a Con-
gressional ban on indecent interstate commercial telephone messages); Dial Info. Servs. Corp.
of N.Y. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991) (sustaining statute as amended in the
wake of Sable); Information Providers' Coalition of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d
866 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding FCC regulation of access to "dial-a-porn services"), cert. peti-
tion filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3360 (Oct. 28, 1991).
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Nazis or Ku Klux Klan groups,"I indecent publicly funded art, 12 records
containing indecent lyrics,' 3  motion pictures unsuitable for chil-
dren,14 excessive violence in the media,' 5 sexually harassing speech in the
11. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v National Socialist Party, 366 N.E.2d 347
(Ill. App. 1977), modified, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. App. 1978); Handley v. City of Montgomery,
401 So. 2d 171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (klan march). See ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY
ENEMY (1979) [hereinafter A. NEIER] for an account of the Skokie incidents and ensuing
litigation as well as much other Nazi and Ku Klux Klan litigation involving the ACLU by the
Executive Director of the ACLU who had escaped Nazi Germany as a boy. See also LEE
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 24-44, 53-58 67-70 & 97-100 (1985).
The Court invalidated an attempt to punish a klansman for advocating violent action in the
non-immediate future in the leading case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.444 (1969).
12. Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991)
(challenging NEA grant process); Contemporary Arts Ctr. v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.
Ohio 1990) (obscenity trial regarding publicly displayed Mapplethorpe photographs). See
Robert O'Neil, Artists, Grants and Rights: The NEA Controversy Revisited, 9 J. HUMAN
RIGHTS 85 (1991); Symposium, Arts Funding and the First Amendment, 14 NOVA L. REV. 317
(1990); Forum, Arts Funding and Censorship: The Helms Amendment and Beyond, 15
COLUM.-VLA J. LAW & ARTS 23 (1990)(featuring Professors Vincent Blasi, Richard Epstein
and Kathleen Sullivan along with Beverly Wolff); Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the
Arts: Free Expression and Political Control, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (1991); see also David
Cole, Big Brother's New Weapon - Rust v. Sullivan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1992, at All
(criticizing the government's reliance on Rust v. Sullivan in justifying a content-based NEA
grant termination); William H. Honan, Judge Overrules Decency Statute for Arts Grants, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1992, at Al (federal district court invalidated law requiring NEA to take
account of "general standards of decency" in suit brought by four performance artists); Wil-
liam H. Honan, After Frohnmayer's Dismissal, Endowment's Future is Cloudy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1992, 2B, at 1 (discussing forced resignation of NEA Chairman following political
attacks by Patrick Buchanan on arts funding policy of the Bush Administration); William
Honan, An Uproar Over Nudes (Bush is One), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at A8 (dispute over
matching grant proposal for a gallery displaying a satirical painting of President Bush and
Dolly Parton in the nude).
13. Luke Records, Inc. v Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court
finding that 2 Live Crew album "As Nasty as They Wanna Be" was obscene); Margaret A.
Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize
Society - From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 822-34
(1992); Robert Houser, Alleged Inciteful Rock Lyrics-A Look at Legal Censorship and Inappli-
cability of First Amendment Standards, 17 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 323 (1990); Cecile Berry &
David Wolin, Regulating Rock Lyrics: A New Wave of Censorship?, 23 HARV. J. LEG. 595
(1986); Paul Scheidemantel, It's Only Rock-and-Roll But They Don't Like It: Censoring "Inde-
cent" Lyrics, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 467 (1986). Cf McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr.
187 (1988) (first amendment requires dismissal of damage suit alleging that Ozzy Osborne
record proximately caused suicide of teenager).
14. Collins, Guidance or Censorship? New Debate on Rating Films, N.Y. TIMES, April 9,
1990, sec. C, at 11. See generally E. DEGRAZIA & R. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS: MOVIES,
CENSORS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1982); Jane Friedman, Motion Picture Rating System of
1968: A Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
(1973).
15. See Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (re-
jecting a television violence addiction claim by a teenage killer); Bill v. Superior Court, 187
Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming dismissal of a claim against motion picture
producers by victim of violence that erupted outside of a theater showing a violent film); Oliva
v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1108 (1982)(affirming summary judgment for defendant where assault victim sued net-
work for broadcasting program which allegedly inspired the assault); Alan Childress, Review
Essay: Reel "Rape Speech": Violent Pornography and the Politics of Harm, 25 LAW & SOCIETY
REV. 177 (1991); Thomas Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment
Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123 (1978); James Albert, Constitutional
Regulation of Televised Violence, 64 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1978).
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workplace, 16 anti-semitic computer messages, 17 displays of the confederate
flag at public schools,18 and advertisements in college newspapers denying
that the holocaust occurred. 19 There are obviously many significant differ-
ences among these issues and controversies. There are important similarities
as well however. At the risk of being overly reductionist, I intend to lump
these and any other similar issues as examples of attempted regulation of
offensive speech and treat them largely as a group. 2
0
Much of the controversy surrounding offensive speech is attributable to
the present state of cultural conflict in the United States and the western
world.2 1 Presently, various groups are engaged in vigorous struggles over
issues of culture, values, standards of behavior, distribution of resources, the
appropriate role of government, and the relationship between the state and
the individual. 22 With the crumbling of consensus and the growth of con-
flict, there is greater opportunity to offend and to be offended. These con-
flicts are multifaceted political, social and cultural disputes and for the most
part are simply not amenable to legal resolution. As noted above many at-
tempts have been made to regulate or prohibit offensive speech. Most of
16. Robinson v. Jackson Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (banning
public display and private possession of pinups and pictures of nude and partially clad women
in the workplace in view of extensive history of sexual harrassment of women by male employ-
ees); CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1977);
Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.--C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990); Stros-
sen, supra note 5, at 498.
17. Michael Miller, Prodigy Network Defends Display of Anti-Semitic Notes, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 22, 1991, at BI.
18. Battles Still Rage over Schools' use of Confederate Flag, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 30,
1991 at A23.
19. Katherine Bishop, Ads on Holocaust 'Hoax' Inspire Campus Debates, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1991, at A, p.12, col. 1.
20. Professor Lawrence appears to be offended that anyone, especially a non-minority,
would consider racist insults merely another form of offensive speech. Lawrence, supra note 5,
at 461. He argues that the injury from racist insults is qualitatively different from and greater
than other forms of offensive speech. Perhaps so. Intuitively, racial insults strike most of us as
the most offensive and most reprehensible of the many contemporary examples of offensive
speech. They would seem more likely to cause serious harm with greater frequency, and more
likely to result in the silencing of victims. Moreover, they would not seem to have any redeem-
ing value. Even so, it is not obvious to me that the injury suffered by the victim of a racial
insult will inevitably be significantly greater than that of a veteran confronted with a flag burn-
ing or a devout conservative Catholic confronted with "Piss Christ" or an impressionable
young child confronted with 2 Live Crew. Perhaps I have not "heard the cries of the victims"
as Professor Lawrence puts it. Id. at 459. And yet his assessments may be as distorted by
cultural bias as are my own. See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 5, at 312-17 and Weinstein,
supra note 5, at 178-79 for development of similar points also largely in response to Professors
Lawrence and Matsuda.
21. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 337-43 (1989); DINESH
D'SOuZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION (1991); E. J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS
(1991); THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION (1991); JAMES D. HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS (1991); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLEC-
TIONS ON MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1991); ROGER KIMBAL, TENURED RADICALS (1990);
ALLEN D. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); Robert Hughes, The
Fraying of America, TIME, Feb. 3, 1992, at 44. Cf MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK




these attempts have either been invalidated under the First Amendment or
at least present serious constitutional problems.
After briefly reviewing the legal landscape in the area of offensive speech, I
will argue that the courts are quite correct in providing a high degree of
protection for offensive speech in spite of the often significant competing
interests. Instead of seeking legal regulation, those who take issue with the
existence, manner or content of offensive speech should challenge it through
counterspeech or should seek to curb it through private pressure.
I will conclude by considering some of the issues that are presented by a
strategy of attacking offensive speech with counterspeech and social pressure
rather than regulation.
II. THE REGULATION OF OFFENSIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Offensive Speech in the Courts
The First Amendment issues raised by the regulation of offensive speech
have been analyzed in great detail elsewhere. 23 I present a very brief over-
view of the development of the law to provide context for my argument
favoring a counterspeech approach. The Supreme Court decided several
cases involving attempts to punish or regulate offensive speech during the
nineteen forties and fifties.24 Some of these early cases provided the state
with a fair amount of leeway to regulate offensive speech such as Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire25 which recognized the fighting words doctrine, Feiner v.
New York 26 which gave the police the right to stop a speaker from inciting
an audience in order to prevent a hostile reaction and Beauharnis v. Illinois27
which sustained a group libel statute against constitutional challenge. Dur-
ing the same period however, the Court provided significant protection for
offensive speech in other cases such as Terminello v. City of Chicago28 where
it precluded the state from convicting a speaker for expression which "stirs
the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or
creates a disturbance .... -29 And in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court
invalidated a permit requirement under the First Amendment speech and
religion clauses as applied to a person who played a phonograph record on
the streets vigorously attacking various religions. 30 While these cases were
significant, they did not confront the legality of regulating offensive speech
simply because of its offensive character.
23. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Mark Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amend-
ment Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1974).
25. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
27. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
28. 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. Id. at 3. The speaker referred to his opponents in the crowd as "slimy scum,"
"snakes," and "bedbugs" however the Court invalidated the jury instructions on their face. Id.
at 13-27 (Jackson, J., concurring).
30. 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1939).
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From the late fifties on, the Court has decided several cases which
strengthen the protection of offensive speech under the First Amendment.
The Court's extension of the First Amendment to sexually oriented speech
short of hard core obscenity provided some degree of protection to a signifi-
cant amount of speech that is offensive to many. 3t In the context of hostile
audience reaction, the Court reaffirmed the lesson of Terminello that the
state is obligated to protect, rather than arrest the speaker if at all possible.32
Cohen v. California33 is probably the Court's most important precedent
protecting offensive speech. There, in a very influential opinion by Justice
Harlan, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the state from
punishing a person under a statute which prohibited "maliciously and will-
fully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person" by "of-
fensive conduct" for wearing a jacket that said "Fuck the Draft" in the
corridor of a courthouse. 34 Justice Harlan's opinion is noteworthy in part
for the care he took in defining the issue as he explained why the doctrines of
conduct versus speech, time place and manner regulation, obscenity, fighting
words, hostile audience reaction and captive audience were not control-
ling.35 The Court concluded that the precise issue presented was whether
the state could "excise, as 'offensive conduct', one particular scurrilous
epithet from the public discourse" out of fear of violent public reaction or to
protect public morality. 36 In analyzing the issue, it developed several
themes which provide protection for offensive speech in a wide variety of
contexts. The Court again emphasized that the state is not free to assume,
absent clear proof, that members of the public are likely to violently attack a
person who utters offensive words, and that where practicable the state is
under a duty to protect the speaker against hostile reaction. 37 Then, in the
most crucial part of its opinion, it made four significant points regarding the
nature of offensive speech and attempts to regulate it. First, it observed that
the "verbal cacophony" which may occur when offensive speech is permitted
is a sign of strength rather than weakness. 38 Second, it emphasized that it
may be impossible for the state to determine which words are sufficiently
offensive to be prohibited noting that "one man's vulgarity [may be] another
man's lyric."' 39 Third, the Court observed that language, especially offensive
31. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
32. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
33. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 18-20.
36. Id. at 22-23.
37. Id. at 22-24.
38. Id. at 25.
39. Id. at 25. See Cunningham v. Georgia, 59 U.S.L.W. 2535, 2536 (Ga. Feb. 22, 1991)
(invalidating a law aimed at "shit happens" bumper stickers which would have prohibited
displaying bumper stickers containing "profane or lewd words describing sexual acts, excre-
tory functions, or parts of the human body"); Baker v. Glover, 19 (BNA) Med. L. Rptr. 1984
(M.D. Ala. 1991) (invalidating a state statute banning the public display of "obscene language




language, is often chosen for its emotive rather than its cognitive force. 40
Finally, the Court recognized that words and ideas may often be inseparable
and that the suppression of the former may result in the suppression of the
latter as well.41 As long as Cohen is taken seriously and read honestly, sig-
nificant regulation of offensive speech should remain the exception rather
than the rule.4 2
Another important offensive speech precedent is the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion in Collin v. Smith 43 invalidating an ordinance designed to prohibit a
Nazi march in Skokie, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago where
many holocaust survivors resided. The decision to permit the march was a
fairly straightforward application of the existing precedent prohibiting view-
point discrimination and censorship by the threat of hostile audience reac-
tion.44 The importance of the decision lies in the fact that there was
evidence that the march could cause real psychological damage to many res-
idents of Skokie and that there was and is a solid societal consensus con-
demning the message of the Nazis as especially repugnant. 45 Even so, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the First Amendment rights of the march-
ers must prevail. 46
If Cohen and Collin indicate that offensive speech is entitled to extremely
broad protection, however, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 47 illustrates that it is
not without limitation, at least in specialized contexts. In Pacifica, the Court
sustained an FCC administrative sanction against a broadcast licensee which
permitted the broadcast of a George Carlin comedy monologue called
"Filthy Words" during early afternoon. 48 A three judge plurality of the
Court in an opinion written by Justice Stevens was willing to permit regula-
tion of the language in part because of the lower social value of patently
offensive speech pertaining to matters of sex and excretion. 49 Justices Powell
and Blackmun were necessary for a majority, however, and only joined in
that portion of Justice Steven's analysis which emphasized the unique as-
pects of the broadcast media including the degree to which it enters the pri-
40. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
41. Id. at 26.
42. See William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v California, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1595
(1987); Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice
Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283.
43. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
44. Id. at 1201-06.
45. Id. at 1201, 1206, 1210.
46. Dean Bollinger was inspired to develop the thesis that instilling the value of tolerance,
at least in the context of expression, explains our commitment to the protection of speech as
offensive and harmful as the Nazis more adequately than traditional free speech rationales.
Bollinger, supra note 11. This rationale also supports the relatively vigorous protection of
other forms of offensive speech as well. See also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION, 165-227 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Tolerance and Truth in the Theory of
Free Expression, 60 So. CAL. L. REV. 647 (1987); Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Toler-
ance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1990).
47. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
48. Id. at 729-30.
49. Id. at 745-46.
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vacy of the home and is particularly accessible to children. 50 Ultimately, the
Court affirmed the FCC's decision to channel offensive speech into times
when children were less likely to be listening than to prohibit it entirely. 5'
Pacifica is a significant precedent primarily because it gave serious consid-
eration to the competing interests affected by offensive speech including the
protection of children and the avoidance of assault by offensive language in
the privacy of one's home. 52 Indeed, the Court permitted regulation of
otherwise protected speech, albeit in a specialized context in order to help
preserve these interests. Moreover, three members of the Court discounted
the degree of protection accorded speech to some extent by its social utility.
More recently in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,53 a majority of
the Court held that a high school did not violate the First Amendment when
it suspended a student for delivering a sexually suggestive campaign speech
to a school assembly. As with Pacifica, the Court took serious account of
the harm purportedly caused by the speech. For the majority, that harm
consisted of insult to teenage girls and emotional damage to young and im-
mature students in the audience. 54 Justice Brennan rejected these state in-
terests but concurred on the ground that the school could punish the student
because the speech was disruptive.55 Like Pacifica, Bethel clearly turns on
the specialized context in which the speech occurred-a public high school
where the Court has consistently recognized that the state has the power to
limit speech in order to preserve its educational objectives. 56 Pacifica and
Bethel illustrate that on occasion, the state may limit or prohibit offensive
50. Id. at 756-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 750. FCC enforcement of the policy increased significantly in the late eighties
with the filing of several complaints. See, e.g., Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 2
F.C.C.R. 2703, 62 R.R. 2d 1199 (1987) (Howard Stern show). The FCC created a safe harbor
for indecent speech between 12 and 6 a.m. Id. On reconsideration the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit invalidated this provision as arbitrary and insufficiently based on
the record. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated
as moot, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Congress then enacted a law requiring the FCC to
enforce the indecency ban twenty-four hours a day. Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat.
2186, 2228 (1988). Accordingly, the FCC passed a rule completely banning the broadcast of
indecent language. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency and Obscenity
in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 457 (1989). The following year, the Supreme Court struck
down a similar Congressional ban on indecent interstate commercial telephone messages in
Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The FCC then filed its
Report on the Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
concluding that the twenty-four hour ban was constitutional in spite of Action for Children's
Television v. FCC and Sable Communications. 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990). The Court of Appeals
then invalidated the FCC order under the First Amendment holding that the Commission
must provide at least a reasonable safe harbour time period during which indecent material
may be broadcast. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
see Blanchard, supra note 13, at 833-40; see generally Passler, supra note 9; Gayoso, supra note
9.
52. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-50; id. at 756-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
54. Id. at 683. The Court noted that many of the students in the audience were under
fourteen years of age. Id.
55. Id. 687-690. Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the school had failed to
establish that the speech was in fact disruptive. Id. 690.
56. Id. at 681-86.
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speech to protect against certain forms of harm, especially to children and
adolescents, but even then only in narrow specialized contexts.
The limited nature of Pacifica was emphasized by Sable Communications
v. FCC,5 7 in which the Court invalidated, as insufficiently narrow, a federal
law prohibiting the transmission of indecent interstate commercial telephone
messages to adults as well as children and explicitly distinguished Pacifica
on the ground that the telephone, unlike the radio, necessarily requires af-
firmative efforts by the auditor greatly decreasing the likelihood that he or
she will be "taken by surprise by an indecent message". 58
The Court's recent decisions in Texas v. Johnson 59 and Eichman v. United
States,6° the flag burning cases, emphasize that when the Court perceives
that prohibition of offensive speech is not view-point neutral, it will invali-
date it even in the teeth of strong public support for the regulation. Like
Collin v. Smith,6 1 the flag burning cases are particularly important because
of the depth of the pain inflicted by the offensive speech. It must have been
apparent to the Court as of Johnson and certainly by Eichman that a large
segment of the American public was hurt and outraged by the public burn-
ing of the American flag, however that appeared to play no part in the
Court's analysis. This suggests that despite Pacifica,6 2 the Court is not in-
clined to back away from established First Amendment protection in this
area in order to accommodate very important competing social interests.
57. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
58. Id. at 127-28. The Court referred to the holding in Pacifica as "emphatically nar-
row". Id. at 127.
Recently, the Court upheld an Indiana law in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., which prohibited
nudity in public places, eschewing a challenge by dancers wanting to dance totally nude in
night clubs. Ill S. Ct. 2456, (1991). Justice Rehnquist, writing for a three judge plurality,
concluded that the nude dancing in issue was expressive conduct but that the state was regulat-
ing it for purposes unrelated to the suppression of expression-to enforce public morality. Id. at
514-15. Justice Souter concurred relying on the state's interest in suppressing the secondary
effects of nude dancing such as increases in crime. Id. at 521-25. Justice Scalia concurred on
the ground that the state was regulating conduct, not expression, and therefore the First
Amendment was inapplicable. Id. at 515. Justice White wrote a dissent joined by three other
members of the Court arguing that the law did indeed regulate the expressive aspects of nude
dancing and failed to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 525. The plurality's apparent
conclusion that the First Amendment protects the right to dance in pasties and a G string but
not totally nude seems arbitrary and foolish. Moreover, none of the justices who joined in the
holding were persuasive in their attempts to explain and defend the state interests involved.
But, accepting Barnes as controlling law, it appears limited to the somewhat unique context of
the regulation of public nudity which, though granted First Amendment protection, is treated
differently than other arguably indecent and offensive forms of speech (including graphic rep-
resentations of nudity). To some extent at least, this reflects societal tradition, on which the
Court relied heavily. Id. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, J.); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). It is hard
to believe that three members of the Court would accept public morality as a legitimate justifi-
cation for regulating even non-expressive aspects of non-obscene but indecent verbal or written
communication outside of exceedingly specialized contexts (generally relating to children).
Consequently, Barnes is not necessarily a particularly significant precedent with respect to
most of the current offensive speech controversies. See Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in
Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 611 (1992) for a thorough analysis of the case.
59. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
60. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
61. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
62. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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The First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint discrimination was
also decisive in the important case of American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Hudnut,6 3 in which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck
down an Indianapolis ordinance that banned pornography defined as "the
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in
words" which include one of several specific representations of women as
sexual objects or subjects of degradation. 64 Writing for the court, Judge Eas-
terbrook was willing to assume that pornography as defined by the ordi-
nance did foster beliefs and attitudes that contributed to the subordination of
women, but still concluded that the ordinance blatantly violated freedom of
speech by censoring officially disapproved depictions of women. 65 As with
the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in Collin v. Smith,66 recognition that
the legislation in issue may protect vulnerable people against real harm did
not justify view-point based prohibition of otherwise protected speech.67
Finally, this term in R.A. V v. St. Paul,68 a unanimous Court invalidated a
city ordinance which prohibited the display of a symbol such as a burning
63. 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
64. Id. at 324. The six categories were:
[T]he Graphic Sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or
in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or
severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, debasement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or
submission or display."
Id. at 324 (emphasis in original). The ordinance was drafted in part by Professor Catherine
MacKinnon. Id. at 325.
65. Id. at 328-31. The ordinance also applied to similar depictions of men, children and
transsexuals. Id. at 324. That did not enhance its constitutionality however, since by prohibit-
ing certain types of depictions of people, the ordinance still discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint.
66. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
67. In the important decision of Butler v. Her Majesty the Queen, the Supreme Court of
Canada recently sustained a provision of the criminal code which declared that "any publica-
tion of a dominant characteristic of which is undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or
more of... crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene." The provision
was construed to properly cover "explicit sex with violence" as well as "explicit sex that is
degrading or dehumanizing .. .if it creates a substantial risk of harm." See Tamar Lewin,
Canada Court Says Pornography Harms Women and Can be Barred, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1992, at Al. This provision is not identical to the feminist pornography laws which have been
proposed or enacted in the United States; however, it is quite similar in theory.
68. 60 U.S.L.W. 4667 (June 23, 1992). The ordinance provided that
"[w]hoever places on private or public property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to, a burning cross, or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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cross or a swastika with knowledge or reason to know that it would cause
"anger, alarm or resentment" on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion or
gender." The case arose out of the prosecution of a minor who burned a
cross on a black family's front lawn.69 A unanimous Minnesota Supreme
Court had sustained the ordinance by construing it to apply only to fighting
words. 70 Although the United States Supreme Court unanimously invali-
dated the ordinance, it was sharply divided in its rationale. In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the majority held that the ordinance violated the First
Amendment's prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in that it only
punished those fighting words which cast aspersions on the basis of specified
characteristics. 7' Justices White and Stevens submitted concurring opinions
in which they argued that the ordinance should be invalidated as overbroad
but that the state should not be precluded from punishing otherwise pros-
cribable expression which causes especially severe social and psychic injury
such as cross burning or racial epithets.72 The majority responded that Jus-
tice Stevens' emphasis on the distinctiveness of the injury was "word play"
since it is the message of racial hatred that is expressed, which renders the
injuries distinct and severe. 73 As such, the ordinance still singles out a cer-
tain limited class of messages for punishment and is thus a clear example of
viewpoint discrimination. 74 Fighting words which insult on the basis of un-
specified characteristics even if in response to proscribed expression would
not be punished. As the majority put it, the state may not "license one side
of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensbury Rules."'75
At a more theoretical level, the Court and the concurrences disagreed as
to whether the state could regulate selectively within the confines of pros-
cribable speech, such as fighting words. The majority reasoned that even
there, viewpoint discrimination regulation is impermissible, 76 while the con-
currences responded that the state should not be forced to address a problem
that it deems less serious such as racially neutral fighting words in order to
reach one that it considers more damaging such as racially based fighting
69. Id. at 4668.
70. In re RAN., 464 N.W.2d 567, 510 (Minn. 1989).
71. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4671-72.
72. Id. at 4673 (White, J., concurring), 4678 (Stevens, J. concurring). Justice White con-
strued the Minnesota Supreme Court ruling as prohibiting "expression that 'by its very utter-
ance' causes 'anger alarm or resentment' and as such punishes expression which merely causes
hurt feelings." Id. at 4673. Justice White's opinion was joined in full by Justices Blackmun
and O'Connor and in part by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined in part by
Justices White and Blackmun. Justices Stevens and White joined each other's overbreadth
analysis but disagreed as to the proper analytical approach to hate speech regulation. Justice
Blackmun submitted a short concurrence suggesting that the Court had reached out unneces-
sarily to write an opinion which would apply to "politically correct speech and cultural diver-
sity." Id. at 4678. Justice White also argued that only the overbreadth challenge was properly
presented to the Court in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 4673 n.1.
73. Id. at 4671.
74. Id. at 4671-72.
75. Id. at 4671.
76. Id. at 4669-71.
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words.77 The majority opinion suggested that the state could prohibit fight-
ing words directed at "certain persons or groups" as opposed to the content
of message if "the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause" were met.78
Justice Stevens responded that there was no basis for distinguishing regula-
tion aimed at protection of the target of the speech from regulation focussing
on the nature of the harm.79 The concurrences tend to ignore or minimize
the extent to which the ordinance discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
rather than subject matter although at some point to be sure, this becomes a
matter of characterization.
Finally, the Court acknowledged that burning crosses to intimidate mem-
bers of minority groups was a serious problem which the state was entitled
to address, however it noted that the petitioner had also been charged under
a racially motivated assault statute which he did not challenge and might
have been charged with several other presumably constitutional offenses in-
cluding arson, criminal damage to property and making terroristic threats.8 0
R.A. V. unquestionably extends significant protection to offensive speech
even in circumstances where it clearly inflicts significant social and psychic
injury. The majority opinion reaffirms the Court's strong disapproval of
viewpoint oriented regulation. This makes it especially difficult to regulate
offensive speech since most such attempts focus on particularly noxious
messages or ideas. Moreover, even the concurrences which argued that the
state should be allowed to prohibit certain types of hate speech, confirmed
that the overbreadth doctrine would still be taken seriously. Combined with
the legacy of cases such as Cohen v. California and Texas v. Johnson, R.A. V
presents a formidable obstacle to the prohibition or regulation of offensive
speech including hate speech.a l
77. Id. at 4674 (White, J., concurring); 4680, 4683 (Stevens, Jr., concurring).
78. Id. at 4071. The majority argued that the federal law criminalizing threats against the
life of the President was an example of a content based distinction that was consistent with the
very reason why the entire class of speech was proscribable and hence not viewpoint discrimi-
natory. Id. at 4670. The dissents replied that such an exception should apply to hate speech as
well. Id. at 4676 (White, J., concurring), 4680 (Stevens, J., concurring). Arguably, the major-
ity was suggesting that perhaps a statute which punished fighting words directed by a member
of one racial group to another regardless of the message conveyed might be constitutional.
Even a prohibition of fighting words directed by a member of racial majority group to a mem-
ber of a racial minority group could survive the majority's First Amendment scrutiny but
might succumb to the Equal Protection hurdle noted by the Court.
79. Id. at 4680.
80. Id. at 4668, 4672-73. See United States v. Lee, 60 U.S.L.W. 2004 (8th Cir. 1991)
(cross burning constituted an attempt to intimidate a person in the exercise of a constitutional
right); 2 leaders of Georgia KKK indicted in cross-burning, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27,
1992, at 3A (KKK leaders, indicted by federal Grand Jury three days before Supreme Court
decision in R.A.V.).
81. Following R.A. V., several commentators speculated that many existing attempts to
regulate hate speech, especially on public university campuses were invalid. See William Celis
3d, Universities Reconsidering Bans on Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1992, § A, p. 11;
Linda Greenhouse, 2 Visions of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1992 at Al; Don Terry,
Decision Disappoints the Victims of Cross-Burning, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992 at A10; Paul
Barrett, Justices Reject Broad 'Hate Crime' Law as Violation of Free-Speech Guarantee, WALL
ST. J., June 23, 1992 at A24.
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B. The Campus Hate Speech Controversies
Probably, the most publicized recent attempts to regulate offensive speech
have been the efforts on several college campuses to draft and apply codes of
behavior which prohibit or regulate speech that is deemed offensive to mi-
norities, women, homosexuals and certain other groups.82 These codes are
generally based on the premise that the speech in issue results in both severe
psychological damage to members of the specified groups and seriously im-
pedes the educational environment 83
Many of the incidents that have given rise to these codes are outrageous and
have quite properly been condemned. 84 The problem is a serious one. Never-
theless, the two campus speech codes which have been challenged in court, the
University of Michigan Code 85 and the University of Wisconsin Code86 have
been readily invalidated under existing precedent. Proponents of speech
codes have relied on a variety of First Amendment doctrines and theories
including: fighting words 87, intentional infliction of emotional distress,88
82. See supra note 5. See Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech
Protection Act of 1991, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469, 1470 n.5 (1991) for a list of campus speech
codes.
83. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 452-66; Matsuada, supra note 5, at 2335-41; Byrne,
supra note 25, at 412-27.
84. See Delgado, Campus, supra note 5, at 348-58; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 431-32;
Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2333 n.71. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER 129-48 (1990) for an insightful analysis of some of the factors which may be
responsible for many of these racist incidents.
85. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Basically, the
code prohibited behavior, including verbal behavior which "stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicapped or Vietnam-era veteran status and that...
involves ... [a] threat to ... academic efforts, employment ... extra-curricular activities or
personal safety; or ... [h]as the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with
[such efforts or activities]." Id. at 856. The Court struck down the provision on grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness. Id. at 864-67. See Robert A. Sedler, Doe v. University of
Michigan and Campus Bans on "Racist Speech": The View From Within, 37 WAYNE L. REV.
1325 (1991) (plaintiff's attorney in Doe arguing that the reasoning of the case would prohibit
almost all campus bans on hate speech).
86. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisc., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991). The Wisconsin Code prohibited speech or expressive behavior only if it is
discriminatory or demeaning, directed at an individual, intended to demean on the basis of a
protected characteristic and intended to create a hostile or intimidating educational
environment. WIs. STAT. ADMIN. CODE T. § UWS 17.06 (2)(a) (Sept. 1989); see Patricia
Hodulik, Racist Speech on Campus, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1433 (1991) (discussion of experience
under the Wisconsin code by the University General Counsel).
87. The much discussed Stanford Code is modeled on the "fighting words" doctrine. See
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FREE EXPRESSION
AND DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT (June 1990). The Stanford Code provision is also set
forth in Lawrence, supra note 5, at 450. The University of Wisconsin unsuccessfully attempted
to rely on the fighting words doctrine in defense of its code. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of
University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1169-71 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
88. This approach was recommended by a task force at the University of Texas. REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON RACIAL HARASSMENT, UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS, AUSTIN (Nov. 27, 1989).
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protecting true academic interchange8 9 and group libel. 9° As Professor
Strossen has shown in her careful analysis of the issues, each of these ap-
proaches has serious if not fatal flaws.91 Still, it is possible that at least a
narrowly drawn code prohibiting a pattern of harassment pursuant to an
intentional infliction of emotional distress and/or preservation of the acad-
emy theories could survive constitutional challenge. 92 Such a provision
would need to focus on intentional and clear instances of harassing speech
and conduct. It would need to be carefully drafted and administered to
avoid problems of overbreadth, vagueness, viewpoint discrimination and se-
lective enforcement. 93 Such a code would not cover the great majority of the
incidents that have given rise to the current controversies on campus 94 and it
surely would not provide an adequate alternative to education, counseling
and counterspeech. 95 Moreover, the proponents of any limited exception to
89. This was the theory of the Michigan code which was invalidated. Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also Byrne, supra note 5, at 416-18 for the
argument that a university should be allowed to prohibit racial insults as part of its mission to
create an interchange which will advance its commitments to truth, humanism and
democracy.
90. The Skokie ordinance challenged by the Nazis was modeled after the Illinois group
defamation statute sustained in Beauharnis v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 250 (1952); see BOLLINGER,
supra note 11, at 31 & nn. 46-47; see also Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech:
Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 281, 286-90 (discussing the
Beauharnais case and reprinting the applicable portion of the Illinois statute).
91. Strossen, supra note 5, at 507-20. The fighting words doctrine has been significantly
narrowed by the Court to cover only those insults which are likely in context to result in
immediate violent reaction. Id. at 508-14. An intentional infliction of emotional distress ap-
proach involves a dangerous degree of subjectivity and vagueness. Id at 515-16. A group
defamation remedy probably does not survive New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 516-17.
92. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 236-45 for an insightful elaboration of the persistent
harrassment approach. See also Massaro, supra note 5, at 230-65 (defending the Stanford type
fighting words code and rejecting broader approaches). A fighting words provision, if narrowly
drafted, could probably also survive challenge, however it would provide little real protection
and hence would only be of symbolic value. See Strossen, supra note 5, at 492, 508, 522; Alan
E. Brownstein, Hate Speech at Public Universities: The Search for an Enforcement Model, 37
WAYNE L. REV. 1451 (1991) (suggesting ways in which a code may be rendered constitutional
and enforceable).
93. Strossen, supra note 5, at 523-47; see also Sedler, supra note 85, at 1336-48 (arguing
that even narrowly drawn codes tend to be aimed at suppressing "racist ideas" and as such
violate the First Amendment); UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin., 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1168-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (invalidating code due to overbreadth, content discrimi-
nation and vagueness). There are many reported examples of the attempted enforcement of
campus speech codes against clearly protected but "politically incorrect" speech. Strossen,
supra note 5, at 528-29; Sedler, supra note 5, at 1334-36. The recent Supreme Court decision
in R.A. V. v. St. Paul reaffirms the power of the viewpoint discrimination and overbreadth
doctrines in this area. But see Hodulik, supra note 86, at 1433-50 (arguing that the Wisconsin
code did not create the problems that Professor Strossen has warned against).
94. See Strossen, supra note 5, at 492; Hodulik, supra note 86, at 1442 (many incidents
that occurred at Wisconsin were not covered by the Code). See notes 114-116 infra for a
discussion of a recent well-publicized incident at Stanford that was not punishable under its
Code.
95. As Professor Massaro has noted, university mandated counterspeech and education
can become heavy handed indoctrination at some point. See Massaro, supra note 5, at 264. At
a state institution, this should raise First Amendment issues in the extreme case. At a private
institution, similar conduct may infringe principles of academic freedom. The university com-
munity is certainly under a moral obligation to make some type of protective response. See
Carter, supra note 5, at 13-42 (arguing that perhaps the state should be sued under an equal
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the First Amendment must explain why the interests to be protected are
qualitatively unique.96 In the context of offensive speech doctrine as it has
developed, the proponent of an exception must explain why the speech in
question is more offensive, harmful, and subject to prohibition than that of
the Nazis in Skokie, the flag burners or the cross burners in St. Paul.97 That
is not an easy task.
III. CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION?
As a matter of existing law, offensive speech is relatively well protected
under the First Amendment. And yet there is little question that various
forms of offensive speech can cause very real harm that society has an inter-
est in preventing. Racial insults, sexually demeaning speech, nazi and klan
demonstrations, burning of the American flag and blasphemous art can
clearly inflict severe emotional pain and in some instances lasting psychic
injury. 98 Indeed, Professor Post has shown how racial insults can cause at
least five different kinds of injury including basic moral harm, defamatory or
subordinating harm to groups, dignitary and emotional injury to individuals,
harm to the market place of ideas through silencing the victims and harm to
educational environments. 99 Sexually offensive speech arguably causes emo-
tional harm to children or at the very least interferes with their parents ef-
forts to raise them in a particular environment.1°° Offensive speech that
depicts the degradation of women or glorifies excessive violence may contrib-
ute to subordination, abuse, harassment, rape and other violent crime.' 0 '
Virtually all offensive speech can interfere with efforts by various communi-
protection theory for failure to protect minorities against serious intimidation and
harassment).
96. Strossen, supra note 5, at 533; see Matsuda supra note 5, at 2357-61 (attempting to
make such a case for racist speech); see also Post, supra note 5, at 316 (illustrating the difficulty
of rationalizing a specific exception, such as racist speech, without the same argument support-
ing a number of other exceptions).
97. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 1350-51. As Professor Massaro points out, those who
build a case for regulation on the reality and depth of the injury inflicted by racial insults, risk
dilution of their claims if they extend the coverage of the regulation too far (i.e., to protect
women, gays and the handicapped) and risk fragmentation of their political coalition if they
don't. Massaro, supra note 4, at 244-45.
98. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S 916
(1978); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 60 U.S.L.W. 4667, 4678, 4683 n.9 (June 23, 1992) (Stevens,
J. concurring); BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 65-70; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 458-66; Mat-
suda, supra 5, at 2236-41; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987).
99. Post, supra note 5, at 272-77.
100. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 747-49 (1978) & 757-61 (Powell, J., concurring);
Attorney General's Comm'n on Pornography 343-345 (1986); HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note
7, at 185-87; Charles Alexander, A Parent's View of Pop Sex and Violence, TIME, May 7, 1990,
at 100.
101. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); ANDREA DWORKIN,
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981). The question of whether or to what extent
pornography contributes to sexual violence is complicated and controversial. See Schauer,
supra note 8, at 737. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 366-74 (1992); Chil-
dress, supra note 15, at 179 (noting that it is very hard to prove harm from pornography).
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ties to define themselves.'0 2 At the same time however, it may contribute to
the ability of both the offended and offending communities to understand
and affirm their own values.
0 3
Can these interests be accommodated or must one necessarily prevail over
the other? Direct legal accommodation of the competing interests through
specific exceptions to First Amendment doctrine or through ad hoc or defini-
tional balancing tends to be a victory for the competing societal interests and
a defeat for freedom of speech. A compelling case can be made that to be
effective, the protection of free speech must be largely unyielding. 0 4 For
instance, Professor Blasi has argued that very stringent protection is essen-
tial in order to resist the pressure to dilute freedom of expression during
recurring pathological periods.' 0 5 Arguably, the present era of cultural con-
flict and political correctness is just such a period. Although "slippery
slope" arguments can be reflexive and dogmatic, this would appear to be an
area in which the danger of losing one's footing and sliding down the slope is
very real indeed. At the present time there are so many different types of
offensive speech claims pressed on society and the courts by aggrieved
groups and individuals, that it will be legally and politically difficult to resist
the granting of exceptions for all once relief is accorded to some. Our com-
mitment to free expression is tested and tested again in hard cases in which
speech causes real harm.' 0 6 An attempt to balance the competing interests
or to carve out one or more first amendment exceptions to the regulation of
offensive speech would constitute a significant step backward from the
speech-protective legacy of Cohen v. California, Texas v. Johnson, and
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.
It might seem that the conflict in issue involves something of a zero-sum
game in which one side loses if the other side wins. As such, if offensive
speech is highly protected, competing social interests are sacrificed. That is
one way of viewing the conflict, but not the only way, and I would argue, not
the best way. Much, though certainly not all of the offensive speech in con-
troversy today occurs in the context of our ongoing cultural conflict. "Polit-
ically incorrect" opinions and charges including vigorous criticism of
affirmative action programs and multiculturalism, for instance, may be con-
sidered racist and offensive to many in the academic community but quite
102. See Post, supra note 5, at 286-87.
103. See BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 157-88:
For speech that attacks and challenges community values the act of toleration
serves to both define and reaffirm those values; the act of tolerance implies a
contrary belief and demonstrates a confidence and security in the correctness of
the community norm. Through toleration, in short, we create the community,
define the values of that community, and affirm a commitment to confidence in
those values.
Id.
104. See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 9-20 (1970).
105. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449 (1985).
106. See BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 13-42; NEIER, supra note 11, at 124, 148.
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appropriate to a large segment of the country. 0 7 Rap lyrics which seem to
celebrate violence and the abuse of women may be an acceptable and largely
rhetorical art form to many black urban males but highly offensive to femi-
nists and white suburbanites. 108 Serrano's "Piss Christ" may outrage many
Christians but be considered an important cultural statement in segments of
the art world. 19 Flag burning may appear an unpardonable affront to most
Americans, while some may consider it a desperate cry of anguish regarding
the status quo.' 10 While, hopefully, few believe that racial insults or Nazi
demonstrations are appropriate behavior, many believe that even speech that
is highly offensive and harmful should be permitted in the United States, if
for no other reason than fear and distrust of government censorship.
If the Constitution, including the First Amendment, is to continue to
serve as a unifying symbol to our nation, it must stand above conflicts of
culture and values and provide and protect the arena in which they may be
resolved through social, cultural, and political struggle.I"' Just as the First
Amendment prohibits the state from banning speech that is offensive to cer-
tain individuals and communities, so it empowers those very persons and
their allies to fight back through speech and associational activity, in order
to define or reshape public or communal values and standards of
behavior. l 12
What can a concerned American do when faced with deeply offensive
speech, be it racial insult, pornography, flag burning, blasphemous art, or
indecent language on the radio? He or she can engage in a wide variety of
activity that clearly is protected by the First Amendment itself, including
speaking out, demonstrating, circulating and signing petitions, writing let-
ters to editors, calling radio talk shows, organizing and attending public fo-
rums and teach-ins, distributing pamphlets, applying peer group pressure,
107. See Hyde & Fishman, supra note 82, at 1472-73, for a catalogue of some of the ex-
cesses of political correctness on campus.
108. See Jon Pareles, On Rap, Symbolism and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, § 2, at 1;
Seth Mydans, For Nonviolent Legacy, A Violent Rap Message, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1992, at A,
(rap music video by Public Enemy depicting assassination of politicians from Arizona, a state
that has failed to recognize the Martin Luther King Holiday); Tom Mathews, Fine Art or Foul,
NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 46; Richard Corliss, X Rated, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 92.
109. Mathews, supra note 108, at 49.
110. See Michelman, supra note 4, at 1362-63.
111. In rejecting strong hate speech regulation based on aggressive substantive equality
theory, Professor Massaro observes that "to impose speech limitations based on a culturally
contested theory seems especially wrong." Massaro, supra note 5, at 243 (emphasis in
original).
112. I believe that Dean Bollinger would view this approach as exemplifying at least some
of the characteristics of the fortress model of free expression of which he is quite critical.
BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 46. He is worried that it creates a "warfare mentality" and
"tends to postulate a social universe in which the citizenry is alienated from the government,
as well as internally from each other, and to induce a posture that can be unfortunately disin-
genuous and manipulative". Id. at 102, 104. Although it may seem cynical, I believe this to be
a relatively accurate perception of our present social universe. I do not believe that our opera-
tive model of free expression created this state, although it probably contributes to it. I see a
wide open approach to expression in the hate speech area as a fair, process-oriented method of
coping with existing cultural conflict. To deny the existence and power of cultural conflict in
our world would be utopian.
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educating children, exercising parental control, and boycotting merchants
who sell offensive products. Assuming that most state regulation of offensive
speech probably is unconstitutional, and assuming that the majority of con-
cerned citizens do not favor unconstitutional legislation, concerned and of-
fended citizens nevertheless can demand responses from their elected
representatives as one effective means of pressuring private groups such as
record companies, television networks or the Motion Picture Association to
take preemptive action.
Private counterspeech and associational action are not easy. They require
sustained effort by ordinary citizens, rather than by professional politi-
cians. 1 3 They can be successful, although there is no guarantee that they
will be. For all of the talk, and some of the action, about speech codes and
various regulations, private and associational actions are the primary means
by which the problems of offensive speech are addressed. 1 4 Skokie, is an
excellent example. After, the A.C.L.U. established that the Nazis had a con-
stitutional right to march in Skokie, the Nazis canceled the march, presuma-
bly because they would have been humiliated by an overwhelmingly larger
and louder counter-demonstration. 1 5 The student and faculty response to a
recent incident at Stanford University, in which a well known conservative
student shouted "Faggot, I hope you die of AIDS" outside of the room of a
gay resident advisor, illustrates the power of counterspeech and peer pres-
sure. 116 Although the campus disciplinary authorities held that the stu-
dent's conduct was protected under Stanford University's speech code,
students and faculty coalesced in a rather thunderous denunciation of the
student's behavior through public petitions and editorials.' '1 From a dis-
tance, it would seem that the reaction may have gone too far, at least to the
113. Dean Bollinger argues that response through the lawmaking process is easier, more
powerful, and more satisfying to the offended community than mere private counterspeech.
BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 72. This probably is true. But it also is true that, to a certain
extent because of these factors, legislative response cuts far more deeply into the values under-
lying freedom of expression.
114. Dean Bollinger notes that we all feel a strong urge to respond to offensive speech
simply because silence may be taken as approval. Id. at 64, 71-72.
115. NEIER, supra note 11, at 8.
116. Ken Myers, An Incident at Stanford Sparks More Dialogue on "PC" Speech, NAT'L
L.J., March 9, 1992, at 4. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 233 n. 202 for an account of a
somewhat similar incident at Arizona State University.
117. Id. Recently, at the SMU Law School, a letter signed by a non-existent organization
attacking minority students and the school's affirmative action program was inserted into the
communications folders of minority students and posted around the law school. The Dean,
Faculty, and Student Bar Association each published letters condemning the anonymous letter
and reaffirming their support for the minority students. An all school public meeting was
called to allow students to engage in a dialogue about diversity at the law school. See Rochelle
Riley, Race Woes Confronted at SMU, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, April 15, 1992, at 1. An
extraordinarily offensive and tasteless parody of a law review article by the late and violently
murdered Professor Mary Jo Frug was distributed by certain members of the Harvard Law
Review at a Law Review banquet. This resulted in great public outcry at the school condemn-
ing both the parody and the administration of the law school itself for allegedly fostering a
hostile atmosphere for women and minorities. Fox Butterfield, Parody Puts Harvard Law
Faculty in Sexism Battle, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1992 at AS. For the argument that the private
response by the faculty & students to the parody was excessive and intolerant see Stuart Tay-
lor, Jr., The Rule of Nonsense at Harvard Law, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 1992, at 25.
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extent that the student was hissed in class and received threatening phone
calls." 8 Counterspeech, like offensive speech itself, can be exercised exces-
sively and irresponsibly. Even so, it is far preferable to official censorship
and, as the Stanford incident suggests, an extremely effective method by
which the community can express its outrage, deter future incidents, and
define or reaffirm its own values.
The appearance of "political correctness", a socially prescribed orthodoxy
of opinion on a variety of issues, including race, gender and sexual prefer-
ence, on many college campuses and elsewhere is to some extent, a legiti-
mate, if often excessive, response to speech and ideas that certain
communities find offensive.' 19 To some extent, political correctness may be
an outraged response to the increase in the number or racist and other dis-
criminatory incidents which have occurred on American college campuses in
recent years.1 20 However, it also may reflect the anxieties of many academ-
ics and students who feel threatened and distressed by their recognition that
the population at large rather decisively rejects the leftist, anti-western, op-
pression centered ideology that is so often fashionable in the academy.' 2 1
Carried to extremes as it frequently has been, political correctness may breed
a certain polarization and resentment which actually encourages intemper-
ate and racist responses.122 I disagree with the world-view, politics, philoso-
phy, to a large extent the values and certainly the intolerance of the
"politically correct". But as long as they attempt to impose their orthodoxy
through speech and peer pressure as they ordinarily do, rather than through
regulatory codes and official coercion, 123 I cannot help but conclude that
they are fighting the culture war vigorously and legitimately as it should be
fought. As such, I salute their commitment, but hope that they fail.
Battles over record and motion picture labeling also exemplify the power
of counterspeech and associational effort. Many people believe that the lan-
guage on records, especially rap and heavy metal, and the gratuitous sex and
violence in motion pictures is harmful to the adolescent audience that is all
but inevitably exposed to it.124 The issues are obviously similar to those
118. Jeff Gottlieb, Campus anti-gay incident unites law school in anger, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEWS, Feb. 11, 1992, at lB.
119. See Massaro, supra note 5, at 260, for the argument that counterspeech, though not
necessarily of the political correctness variety, stands a better chance of rebutting hate speech
on college campuses than anywhere else.
120. See supra note 82.
121. BORK, supra note 21, at 337-43; D'SOUZA, supra note 21, at 124-56; see also Sedler,
supra note 85, at 1329-30.
122. See generally D'SOUZA, supra note 21, at 125-36.
123. See Steven C. Bahls, Political Correctness and the American Law School, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1041 (1991) (a significant percentage of law students believe that many law professors
tend to be intolerant of the expression of opposing political views in class); see also Levin v.
Harleston, 60 U.S.L.W. 2791 (2d Cir. June 23, 1992) (state college violated First Amendment
rights of professor who had made controversial statements concerning race and IQ by setting
up "shadow sections" into which his students could transfer and by setting up a faculty com-
mittee to investigate his writings); Arlynn Lieber Presser, The Politically Correct Law School:
Where It's Right to be Left, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 52.
124. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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addressed in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.125 Proponents of some labeling
with regard to records and an improved guidance system with respect to
motion pictures lobbied Congress, state legislatures and municipalities for
regulation. 126 Any legislation which might have resulted almost certainly
would have been invalidated and many of the proponents of such legislation
must have known that to be the case. The effort helped to prompt the re-
spective industries to adopt or revise self-policing procedures however. 127
Whether the resulting products are satisfactory may be debated. Still, it is
an example of how private pressure with respect to offensive speech can initi-
ate a private accommodation. The protest movement which resulted in the
7-11 stores' decision to discontinue the sale of Playboy and Penthouse is a
more problematic example of a successful attempt to limit the availability of
offensive materials since it apparently involved pressure from staff members
of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography as well as from pri-
vate citizen groups.128
As, political correctness, and perhaps all of these examples illustrate, pri-
vate counterspeech and pressure can be excessive and intolerant. 29 It can
result in self-censorship-indeed, that is often, though not always the point.
That obviously raises the question of whether privately induced self-censor-
ship is any less of a problem than legally coerced censorship? Reflection
should suggest however that state imposed censorship is significantly more
dangerous than whatever chill may be induced by pressure from private
groups.' 30 The coercive power of the law itself renders official censorship
qualitatively more severe. Private communities and interest groups can
hardly call upon fines, imprisonment, other sanctions, injunctions, the inves-
tigatory and prosecutorial power of the state, and the moral authority of the
125. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
126. See Berry & Wolin, supra note 13, at 596 (describing the successful lobbying by a
variety of groups including the PTA and Reverend Jesse Jackson's PUSH); Blanchard, supra
note 13, at 822-33; Lewis Grossman, Self-Censorship by Media Industries, 15 COLUM. VLA J.
L. & ARTS 443 (1992) (discussing lobbying campaigns to induce self-censorship by the motion
picture, comic book, television, and record industries); Jon Pareles, Companies to Label Ex-
plicit Records, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1990, at BI; Burges, Arizona: 'No ID, no LP', DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 1990, at A43; Howard, Unbecoming Attractions, FW Parents Vow
to Continue Seeking law to Keep Youth from Films rated R, NC-i 7, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 2, 1992, at 33A.
127. Id. Recently, some police organizations threatened to boycott Time Warner and its
subsidiaries to protest a rap record by Ice-T titled Cop Killer which celebrates the killing of
police officers. Todd Copilevitz & Manuel Mendoza, Police Plan Protests Over Rap Song,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 10, 1992, at A 25; John Leland, Rap and Race, NEWSWEEK,
June 29, 1992 at 47; see also Annetta Miller, Do Boycotts Work?, NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1992, at
58. Ultimately, Ice-T dropped the song from the album but attributed the decision to personal
threats rather than pressure from the boycott. Sheila Rule, 'Cop Killer' To Be Cut From Ice-T
Album, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at B1..
128. See Hawkins & Zimring, supra note 7, at 203-204; Corliss, supra note 108, at 98.
129. Dean Bollinger's tolerance rationale for freedom of expression is concerned with pri-
vate suppression through intolerance as well as state censorship. BOLLINGER, supra note 11,
at 80. For the reasons stated in the text at infra notes 138-140, I consider this problem signifi-
cantly less threatening.
130. See BOLLINGER, supra note 11, at 13; see also Massaro, supra note 5, at 245-48 for the




law itself to enforce their wills. Rarely, if ever, could private community
pressure achieve the pervasive and lasting impact on speech that one would
expect from the force of law. Quite apart from the absence of official sanc-
tions, it is unlikely in a society as diverse as ours that one particular commu-
nity would be able to impose a single minded approach on an issue which by
definition would be controversial. Nor will the limits of the permissible be as
frozen into place by private pressure, which should fluctuate with changes in
society, as it might by positively enacted law.
It is well recognized that one function of the First Amendment is to pro-
vide a check on government power.' 3 ' Such a check is necessary in view of
the importance of maintaining free access to information about official con-
duct and because of the threat that government censors will inevitably be
biased in favor of censorship or against unpopular speakers or opinions.132
These concerns are not as compelling with respect to private pressure groups
since they will not have the pervasive power of government. Plus there
should be similarly situated competing groups to challenge their contentions.
Attempts to encourage self censorship through private pressure do present a
somewhat unique threat to free expression, however, in that unlike state reg-
ulation, clear standards and strict procedural due process are not
required. 133
Though most theories of free expression assume to a large extent that
more speech is good and that officially compelled censorship is bad, it is
certainly not obvious that private pressure to induce self-censorship is neces-
sarily bad for society. Racial insults or epithets provide a case in point.
Those who argue that the First Amendment precludes the state from prohib-
iting racial insults do not contend that such speech is desirable and should be
encouraged or even tolerated privately-quite the contrary. There is proba-
bly all but unanimous opinion that private citizens and communities such as
university students and faculties should attempt to totally discourage racial
insults through education, counseling, argument, righteous indignation and
other means of influencing community standards as recently happened with
respect to the sexual orientation epithets at Stanford University. 134 This
would seem to be a legitimate use of the power of speech although it can
become improperly heavy-handed if coercively imposed by the university it-
self.135 Indeed, considering that racial, gender based and sexual preference
based insults may be intended to and will often have the effect of "silencing"
the victims,1 36 and considering that by definition, the victims will often be
131. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521.
132. Id. at 538-44.
133. See Scheidemantal, supra note 13, at 502-07.
134. See notes 116-118 supra and accompanying text.
135. See Massaro, supra note 5, at 264.
136. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 458-66; Matsuda, supra note 5 at 2376. For a compel-
ling argument that prohibiting racist insults will not solve the problem of silencing, which is
probably more attributable to systemic racism in any event, but will distort the marketplace of
free expression, see Post, supra note 5, at 302-11.
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members of minority groups, 137 the larger community must assume the re-
sponsibility of speaking out vigorously against such attacks. Those who be-
lieve that there is a place for racial or other such epithets on campus or
elsewhere will remain legally free to engage in them if they are willing to
accept the stinging rebuke of their fellow students or citizens.
It must be acknowledged that social and cultural struggle will not neces-
sarily produce the optimum amount of free expression at any given time.
Peer pressure can readily breed unthinking orthodoxy but that is a matter
which over time will be challenged and hopefully corrected in the market-
place of expression itself. Political correctness has its truths and it has its
excesses. Those excesses are regularly ridiculed in the press and on campus
and eventually, they will probably be whittled away. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that either legal regulation (however carefully crafted) or
uncritical tolerance of all that is spoken or written would strike a better
balance. The first carries all of the threats and difficulties of government
censorship while the second makes no attempt to accommodate the compet-
ing societal interests at all.
The excesses of private pressure will be restrained to a very significant
extent by the dynamics of the process. To be successful at influencing stan-
dards of speech and conduct, a significant number of the members of a pri-
vate community must be willing to devote a fairly sustained amount of time
and effort to the issue. Most people are unwilling or unable to make such a
commitment unless the issue is quite unique and important to them. There
are, of course, professional interest groups such as the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, which take positions on speech issues as a matter of course, how-
ever, the public can easily grow skeptical and cynical about organizations
that are perceived to protest, complain and warn too frequently. 38 As the
aftermaths of the Bork and Thomas nominations tend to suggest, most peo-
ple, including those who enjoy participating in major cultural conflicts, can
do battle for only so long before they need a period of repose. Consequently,
although cultural conflicts over offensive speech can be expected to continue
in this divided and divisive society, they will be intermittent and the truly
pitched battles will only be sustained over relatively significant issues (if only
from a symbolic standpoint). This further limits the extent to which private
pressure can have a pervasive chilling effect.
Finally, one must ask whether a strategy of encouraging or participating
in cultural conflict through expressive activity is wise and desirable for a
person committed to First Amendment values. The most familiar models of
freedom of expression such as the self government theory and the market-
place of ideas often seem to be quite tempered and rational in their orienta-
tion. Moreover, most of us would ideally like to envision ourselves as
137. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 466-72; Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2376.
138. It can be costly for an organization to vigorously pursue an intuitively unpopular
public campaign. See NEIER, supra note 11, at 69-104 for a detailed account of the increases
and decreases in ACLU. membership due to its support of unpopular causes, especially the




tolerant, fair-minded people who are prepared to listen to opposing view-
points and if we disagree, express that disagreement in a reasoned, civil, re-
spectful but persuasive manner designed to convince a worthy but
openminded opponent of the errors of his or her position. Such a model fails
to adequately describe the raucous, overreaching, rhetorical and ofttimes
disingenuous and intolerant style of argument which is likely to prevail in
the highly charged context of cultural conflict. In the heat of battle, speak-
ers will often attempt to persuade through emotionalism and misrepresenta-
tion rather than through careful analysis and illumination. Senator
Kennedy's early attack on the nomination of Judge Bork is one well known
successful example of such demagoguery. 139 President Bush's use of the
pledge of allegiance issue in the 1988 presidential campaign is another. 14°
This is the rhetoric of the campaign trail, of the fierce political struggle, and
of the angry dissenter. It is a form of speech that the Supreme Court had in
mind in Terminello v. Chicago when it wrote that "a function of free speech
under our system of government is to invite dispute [and] [i]t may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger"' 4'
or what it had in mind in New York Times v. Sullivan when it wrote that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open."' 142
And it is the kind of speech that the Court had in mind in Cohen v. Califor-
nia when it proclaimed that this "verbal cacophany is . . . not a sign of
weakness but of strength."' 43 It is a form of rhetoric that the Court has
protected regularly. 44
In vigorous dissents from the Ninth Circuit's refusal to grant an en banc
hearing in the recent case of McCalden v. California Library Association,
Judges Kozinski and Reinhardt argued persuasively that the majority had
misunderstood the degree to which protected counterspeech can permissibly
be threatening and indeed dangerous. 145 There, the panel reversed the dis-
missal of several state law causes of action such as interference with contrac-
tual relationships in a lawsuit brought by self-styled "Holocaust revisionists"
who were denied the opportunity to set up an exhibit at the California Li-
brary Association convention after several Jewish groups threatened to en-
gage in potentially disruptive demonstrations. 146 The dissents correctly
recognized that the alleged threats of unprotected disruption were plead
with insufficient specificity in a free speech case and that such threats them-
selves are not necessarily unprotected in the context of raucous political
139. ETHAN BRONNER, THE BATTLE FOR JUSTICE, 98-99 (1989).
140. See Waving the Bloody Shirt, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1988, at 116-17.
141. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
142. 376 U.S. 255, 270 (1963).
143. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
144. See, e.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 268 (1974) ("a scab is a traitor to his
God, his country, his family and his class"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 n.I (1972)
("White son of a bitch", "I'll kill you"); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 479 (1969) ("If they
let that happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag").
145. No. 88-5727, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 750, at *34 and *51 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 1992).




Emotionally charged overstatement, angry denunciation, and shrill and
threatening protest are not the only rhetorical weapons for doing cultural
battle. This form of debate annoys a great many people and grows tiresome
even with those who enjoy it to some extent. Often, in the heat of conflict
over emotionally charged issues, reason and moderation will be the wisest
and the most promising approach. My point is simply that both as a polit-
ical weapon and as a method of free expression, a bit of flat out demagogu-
ery, is not necessarily something to be suppressed or even embarrassed by.
Quite apart from the self interested strategy of the speaker to avoid losing
more support than he or she gains, the limits of protected expression apply
to cultural conflict as elsewhere. Speakers and protestors must remain
within the law. However emotionally intense the issues, there is no license
to trespass, obstruct movement of the public or access to public facilities or
businesses or to engage in acts of violence or destruction. 148 In the context
of abortion clinic protests for instance, peaceful protest on public property
outside of a clinic should generally be permissible,' 49 however blockage of
access should not be tolerated. 50 The threat of disruption obviously con-
vinced the majority in the McCalden case that defendants' plans were not
protected by the First Amendment.' 5' Had the plaintiffs been able to allege
with greater specificity that the defendants themselves intended to engage in
violence and property damage if the Holocaust revisionists were permitted to
set up their exhibit, it is unlikely that there would have been a basis for the
strong dissents that were submitted.
The practice of heckling can only be addressed in context. To some ex-
tent, vocal disapproval, including at key points within the delivery of a
speech for instance, should be protected as an effective means of counter-
speech. A well placed interjection, not necessarily polite, can, on occasion,
147. Id. at * 37-50 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); id. at * 51-70 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
148. Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (affirming injunction against
trespassing at abortion clinic); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582,
585 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, I1I S. Ct. 1070 (1991) (affirming injunction prohibiting
blocking access to abortion clinic); Northeast Women's Ctr. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 47, 62
(3d Cir. 199 1) (injunction limiting access to abortion clinic found reasonable); New York State
National Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1363-64 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 947 (1990) (affirming permanent injunction prohibiting blocking access to abortion
clinic).
149. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted 112 L. E. 2d 1176 (Feb. 25, 1991) (refusing to broaden injunction to cover intimi-
dation, harassment or disturbance of patients); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v.
Advocates for Life, 849 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1988) (modifying injunction to permit shouting,
yelling and chanting that does not substantially interfere with abortion clinic); Mahoney v.
District of Columbia, 58 U.S.L.W. 2454 (D.C.D.C. 1990) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting
picketing within one hundred yards of an abortion clinic). Cf Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1989); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
150. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989) (upholding application of civil R.I.C.O. to harassing abortion
clinic clients, trespassing and destruction of property); State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo.
App. 1989) (no necessity defense to trespassing at abortion clinic).
151. McCalden, 1992 U.S. 750 at *20-23.
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do more to undermine the impact of an argument than unlimited rebuttal.
Thus, as long as heckling does not completely disrupt the speaker or pre-
clude the presentation, it should probably be protected in public facilities.
When it does interfere too significantly with the speaker's ability to be heard,
it can probably be prohibited as reasonable time, place and manner
regulation. 152
Combatting offensive speech in the rough and tumble of the marketplace
isn't for everyone. A person's decision whether to fight offensive speech with
counterspeech will depend on many factors including the depth of commit-
ment to the issues at stake, comfort with public debate, assessment of the
potential impact of such strategy and the amount of spare time available. It
may not be the easiest or the most effective way of countering offensive
speech and attempting to preserve community standards. Legal regulation,
if constitutional (generally a doubtful if) might have greater impact and be
less trouble for the ordinary citizen. But fighting back through counter-
speech is a better way to proceed because it has the potential to preserve the
First Amendment freedom for all persons and communities in spite of their
severe disagreements and provides a means by which these individuals and
groups may accommodate their disagreements however roughly, by exercis-
ing free expression rather than by regulating it.
152. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (prohibition of picketing in front of a resi-
dence was valid as reasonable time, place, and manner regulation); Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (ban on camping in D.C. parks applied to demon-
strations dramatizing the plight of the homeless was reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation).
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